

I MINA'TRENTAI OCHO NA LIHESLATURAN GUÅHAN
RESOLUTIONS

Resolution No.	Sponsor	Title	Date Intro	Date of Presentation	Date Adopted	Date Referred	Referred to	PUBLIC HEARING DATE	DATE AUTHORS REPORT FILED	NOTES
169-38 (COR)	William A. Parkinson	Relative to urging the federal government to treat the vulnerability of Guam's above-ground electric grid as a matter of disaster resilience and national security and to provide funding for the undergrounding and hardening of the island's power infrastructure.	4/23/26 2:34 p.m.							

I MINA'TRENTAI OCHO NA LIHESLATURAN GUÅHAN
2026 (SECOND) Regular Session

Resolution No. 169-38 (COR)

Introduced by:

William A. Parkinson 

Relative to urging the federal government to treat the vulnerability of Guam's above-ground electric grid as a matter of disaster resilience and national security and to provide funding for the undergrounding and hardening of the island's power infrastructure.

1 **BE IT RESOLVED BY THE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF *I***
2 ***MINA'TRENTAI OCHO NA LIHESLATURAN GUÅHAN*:**

3 **WHEREAS**, Guam is a typhoon-prone island in the Western Pacific that is
4 repeatedly exposed to destructive winds, torrential rain, flooding, salt intrusion, flying
5 debris, and prolonged infrastructure disruption; and these are not hypothetical risks, but
6 recurring and foreseeable threats to life, property, economic activity, and the continuity of
7 essential civilian and military operations; and

8 **WHEREAS**, the recent destruction and disruption caused by Super Typhoon
9 Sinlaku on Guam and throughout the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
10 has once again demonstrated the severe vulnerability of the Marianas to major storm
11 events, with Guam enduring prolonged damaging winds, widespread utility disruptions,
12 emergency shelter operations, road hazards, and dangerous conditions for restoration
13 crews; and

14 **WHEREAS**, the effects of severe typhoons in the Marianas do not end when the
15 eye passes, but instead trigger extended humanitarian, infrastructure, and economic

1 consequences, including prolonged dangerous conditions, sheltering of residents,
2 interruptions to government operations, strain on utilities, and delayed restoration of
3 normal services, all of which underscore that resilient utility infrastructure is
4 indispensable to public safety; and

5 **WHEREAS**, Guam’s experience in Typhoon Mawar in 2023 likewise showed
6 that even where parts of the system avoided a total blackout, severe typhoon conditions
7 still inflicted widespread damage to transmission and distribution infrastructure, and
8 GPA reported in oversight proceedings before the Guam Legislature that all 115kV
9 transmission lines sustained serious damage and that most 34.5kV overhead
10 transmission lines also sustained serious damage; and

11 **WHEREAS**, Guam Power Authority further reported to that oversight hearing
12 that approximately seven (7) megawatts of load, mainly serving Andersen Air Force
13 Base, remained energized throughout Typhoon Mawar through underground
14 transmission lines and hardened facilities, and that customers served by underground
15 transmission and distribution were restored more quickly, including Guam Memorial
16 Hospital and much of Tumon Bay, thereby proving in real-world conditions that
17 undergrounding and hardening materially improve resilience, continuity of service, and
18 restoration speed during and after super typhoons; and

19 **WHEREAS**, this same oversight record established that substations fed through
20 underground transmission lines were restored more quickly than those dependent on
21 overhead transmission lines, further demonstrating that exposed aerial infrastructure
22 remains the most predictable point of failure during destructive typhoon conditions on
23 Guam; and

24 **WHEREAS**, the unavoidable lesson from successive typhoons is that an electric
25 grid materially dependent on aerial transmission and distribution lines will continue to
26 suffer repeated storm-related outages and repeated costly restoration cycles, because
27 even where poles survive, overhead conductors, crossarms, transformers, insulators,
28 and associated hardware remain vulnerable to wind damage, falling vegetation, debris
29 strikes, moisture intrusion, and cascading line failures; and

1 **WHEREAS**, Guam Power Authority has already developed a preliminary
2 infrastructure resiliency plan estimating that underground transmission lines and indoor
3 substations would cost approximately Eight Hundred Thirty-Three Million Dollars
4 (\$833,000,000), critical distribution system mitigation would cost approximately Eight
5 Hundred Thirteen Million Dollars (\$813,000,000), other critical infrastructure
6 resiliency projects would cost approximately Seven Hundred Thirty Million Dollars
7 (\$730,000,000), and undergrounding the remaining distribution system would cost
8 approximately Four Billion Twenty-Five Million Dollars (\$4,025,000,000), for a total
9 preliminary resiliency estimate of approximately Six Billion Four Hundred One Million
10 Dollars (\$6,401,000,000); and

11 **WHEREAS**, Guam Power Authority has also expressly acknowledged that
12 GPA’s own ability to obtain funding for such investments is doubtful, and that if GPA
13 were forced to secure such financing itself, power rates would likely double, if not more,
14 making energy costs unaffordable for the people of Guam; and

15 **WHEREAS**, Guam’s civilian ratepayer base is far too small to absorb, through
16 utility bills, a multi-billion-dollar undergrounding and hardening program of this
17 magnitude without inflicting severe and unacceptable rate shock on households, small
18 businesses, working families, and the island economy; and it would be manifestly
19 inequitable to require Guam’s local ratepayers to shoulder alone the cost of
20 infrastructure whose resilience is indispensable not only to local civilian life, but also
21 to federal military readiness and national defense; and

22 **WHEREAS**, Guam Power Authority has recognized that it is the sole provider
23 of energy for the island community, including military installations, and that Guam’s
24 power grid must be prepared for both national disasters and military contingencies,
25 making the hardening of Guam’s electrical system not merely a local utility concern,
26 but a matter of federal strategic importance; and

27 **WHEREAS**, Guam’s only islandwide electric utility powers not only homes and
28 businesses, but also Guam Memorial Hospital, the Port Authority of Guam, airport
29 operations, water wells, wastewater facilities, telecommunications, emergency shelters,

1 public safety operations, and other critical infrastructure upon which civilian continuity
2 and emergency response depend, and any prolonged failure of this system creates
3 immediate consequences for health, safety, commerce, and disaster recovery; and

4 **WHEREAS**, under federal law, the Department of Defense is an executive
5 department of the United States, and the Secretary of Defense is the head of the
6 Department of Defense, and the Department's stated mission is to provide the military
7 forces needed to deter war and ensure the nation's security, and it would therefore be
8 strategically incoherent for the federal government to harden runways, ports, missile
9 defense assets, and defense facilities on Guam while leaving the sole islandwide electric
10 system that powers and supports those assets dangerously exposed to repeated typhoon
11 damage; and

12 **WHEREAS**, if the federal government expects Guam to function as a frontline
13 platform for deterrence, logistics, and operations in the Western Pacific, then the federal
14 government must also accept responsibility for helping fund the resilience of the core
15 civilian infrastructure without which those missions cannot reliably function, including
16 ensuring that the people of Guam are not forced through unaffordable utility rates to
17 subsidize what is, in substantial part, a federal homeland security and national defense
18 requirement; and

19 **WHEREAS**, ensuring the resilience of Guam's electric grid requires substantial
20 federal investment, including direct appropriations, grants, cooperative agreements,
21 hazard mitigation support, defense-related infrastructure assistance, and other lawful
22 funding mechanisms; and

23 **WHEREAS**, federal support for grid resilience should prioritize, at minimum,
24 those circuits and facilities serving Andersen Air Force Base, Naval Base Guam, Guam
25 Memorial Hospital, the Port Authority of Guam, airport operations, water and
26 wastewater infrastructure, emergency shelters, communications systems, and other
27 essential public and defense-related facilities; and

28 **WHEREAS**, Guam should be made eligible, through legislation, appropriations,
29 defense authorization measures, insular affairs funding, Federal Emergency

1 Management Agency mitigation programs, Department of Energy grid resilience
2 initiatives, and other lawful mechanisms, for a long-term, multi-phase undergrounding
3 and hardening program tailored to the island’s unique typhoon exposure, geography,
4 and strategic role; and

5 **WHEREAS**, the people of Guam should not be asked to shoulder alone the
6 immense cost of constructing an electric system capable of withstanding threats that are
7 both natural and strategic in nature; and

8 **WHEREAS**, the repeated battering of the Marianas by storms such as Mawar
9 and Sinlaku makes clear that undergrounding and hardening Guam’s electric grid is no
10 longer a matter that can be deferred as a long-term aspiration, but must be treated as an
11 urgent and necessary resilience investment for the protection of the people of Guam,
12 the continuity of civilian government, the preservation of essential services, and the
13 security of the United States itself; now, therefore, be it

14 **RESOLVED**, that the Committee on Rules of *I Mina’trentai Ocho Na Liheslaturan*
15 *Guåhan* does hereby, on behalf of *I Liheslaturan Guåhan* and the people of Guam, urge
16 the federal government to treat the vulnerability of Guam’s above-ground electric grid as
17 a matter of disaster resilience and national security and to provide funding for the
18 undergrounding and hardening of the island’s power infrastructure.

19 **RESOLVED**, that the Speaker and the Chairperson of the Committee on Rules
20 certify, and the Legislative Secretary attest to, the adoption hereof, and that copies of the
21 same be thereafter transmitted to the President of the United States; the Speaker of the
22 United States House of Representatives; the Majority Leader of the United States Senate;
23 the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of Homeland Security; the Secretary of the Interior;
24 the Secretary of Energy; the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management
25 Agency; the Assistant Secretary for Insular and International Affairs; the Honorable James
26 C. Moylan, Delegate from Guam to the United States House of Representatives; and the
27 Honorable Lourdes A. Leon Guerrero, *I Maga’hågan Guåhan*.

**DULY AND REGULARLY ADOPTED BY THE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF
I MINA'TRENTAI OCHO NA LIHESLATURAN GUÁHAN ON THE DAY
OF APRIL 2026.**

FRANK BLAS JR.
Speaker

V. ANTHONY ADA
Chairperson, Committee on Rules

SABRINA S. MATANANE
Legislative Secretary